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HyperLaw Icon HyperLaw Letter to Hon Richard Posner, Seventh Circuit Re ABA Citation Proposal, March 21, 1997


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HyperLaw Letter to Hon Richard Posner, Seventh Circuit Re ABA Citation Proposal, March 21, 1997


HyperLaw's letter responds to the letter of Judge Posner that was filed with the Judicial Conference Automation Committee on March 3, 1997. Judge Posner's letter refers to a letter from Judge Stephen Williams of the District of Columbia Circuit. [The two letter are in Acrobat pdf format].

HyperLaw, Inc.
March 21, 1997
The Honorable Richard A. Posner Chief Judge United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit 213 South Dearborn Street Chicago, Illinois 60604 Dear Judge Posner: [1]     I am more than a little dismayed by your letter of March 3, 1997 to Judge Forrester, Chair of the Automation & Technology Committee, in which you oppose the ABA citation proposal. I can only believe that the proposal was somehow misrepresented or was not accompanied with sufficient explanatory information. [2]     As a former student of yours at the University of Chicago Law School, I am aware of your methodology of economic analysis. Certainly, I would have expected you to conclude that economic efficiency, for society as a whole, would dictate that courts assign citations at the time of opinions are disseminated. The subsequent costs to society based upon current practice are inefficient, costly, and ultimately lead to limited access by the public to the law. This indeed was understood by John B. West, founder of West, as explained by him in a 1909 article, which I enclose. [3]     In your scholarly writings, particularly in The Federal Courts: Crisis And Reform, you have emphasized the role of judge- made law in judicial decision making. The opinions of the courts are essential to the operation our legal system. Your writings exquisitely express the role of precedent. Precedent is in a very real sense the law. At page 248 of that book, you argue that law gives people notice as to what is acceptable behavior and projects future rulings. Of course, this is purely a theoretical position if the people (and I exclude as "the people" here law professors, judges, and well heeled law firms) do not have access to the law. [4]     In your economic analysis of precedent, you clearly recognize that uncertainty in case law invites litigation. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and Emperical Analysis, 19 J.L. & Econ., 249, 271 (1976). To the extent that those who are expected to abide by the law face artificial barriers to access to the law, then uncertainty increases and economic costs of litigation increase as well. It does little good to clarify the law with precedential decisions, and then hide the opinions behind barriers. [5]     I am also aware of the position you had taken on charging for access to Seventh Circuit opinions and I believe that the reasoning in that order remains sound:
Charging a fee for this previously free public information amounts to a confiscatory tax on public information. If we had charged nongovernmental users a fee during the last year, they would have paid $10,800. When compared with the costs to the court of about $468 per year, it is obvious that such a charge is not a user fee, but a tax on previously free court information. In addition charging such a fee raises serious questions as to whether the courts are dissuading the many new computer services that have recently started to compete with the large companies which have traditionally provided the lawyers with legal research materials. According to reports in the December, 1994 issue of American Bar Association Journal at pp. 38-39, the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice is looking at barriers to entry in the computer-assisted legal research market. The Department is looking for ways to improve public access to federal court opinions. Our system has no barriers, encourages public access, and saves the government money. A fee system will cost more than the current nonfee system.
In The Matter Of Public Access To The Seventh Circuit Bulletin Board System (BBS), Administrative Order, January 3, 1995. [6]     The policy reasons to which you refer in the Order are the same that underly the ABA citation proposals. Indeed, last week the United States Department of Justice (to which you also refer in your order) filed comments to the Judicial Conference in support of the citation proposal which explains in detail the economic barriers presented by the present system. I am enclosing a copy of those comments. [7]     Among other things, in your Public Access Order you correctly noted that increased cost in one area may in other areas actually reduce overall costs. This is also the situation with the use of an immediately available citation inserted by the court. For example, if you wish to cite to one of your own opinions, you would be able to use your own manuscript for the identification and pin-point citation. You would not need to locate the West version to obtain the citation and to attempt to locate in the West version the location of the point to which you wish to cite. [8]     Even were local costs to increase, it is likely that overall social costs would decrease. Experience with public domain citations has established that electronic case law reporters are substantially less expensive where there are available citable authoritative public domain citations. Thus overall social costs would be reduced. [9]     If caselaw research costs were to be reduced, then local costs to the court would be reduced, because the cost of research would be reduced. It is interesting to note that the price of Federal Supplement where West has a clear monopoly has increased enormously in the last two years, even though raw material costs, principally paper, have gone down. The following message was recently posted by a Chicago law librarian on the law-lib Internet list.
Date: Fri, 24 Jan 1997 15:55:31 -0600 (CST) From: Frank Drake Sender: owner-law-lib@ucdavis.edu Subject: West Inflation To: law-lib I just got volume 939 of Federal Supplement; the cost, including shipping and tax was $40.61. Inflation history: A volume in January 1995 was $33.30 A volume in January 1996 was 36.45 A volume in January 1997 is $40.61 1995-1996 inflation 9.5% 1996-1997 inflation 11.4% I suppose the figures speak for themselves. FRANK DRAKE Arnstein & Lehr CHICAGO arnstein@mcs.com
The impact of these on the book acquistion budget, not only for the federal judiciary, but for all other agencies and departments of the federal government must be enormous. [10]     Also, there is the issue of first costs, because long term costs will be reduced to society because the citation persists for years. [11]     Many courts have been manipulated into accepting the present system because of apparent lower local costs, notwithstanding the overall costs to society. For example, if a court accepts discounted access to Westlaw and West books in return for a variety of concessions and favors including the perpetuation of the present citation system, certainly local costs to the court are lower, at the expense of everyone else. I for one do not believe the courts should enter into contracts to purchase legal research services and books at prices lower than that available to the general public. [12]     The foregoing analysis is not intended to be comprehensive, but is provided only to suggest the possible analysis that could be made of these issues. [13]     In your March 3 letter, you state: "anyone with the West citation can readily locate the opinion on-line if he prefers that to the book version." [14]     This statement raises two issues: one is whether the purpose of the proposal was sufficiently explained to you–and there is an implication that this is form over substance. I will not address the various policy reasons, because these are adequately explained in the other documents which I enclose. However, I would like to suggest that you are absolutely incorrect if your "anyone" is to be taken literally. If anyone means a law professor or student at the University of Chicago Law School, you are correct. If anyone means a federal judge with unlimited access to Westlaw, you are correct. If "anyone" means any lawyer in a large law firm, then you are correct. This class of people probably numbers under 100,000 individuals. But, for everyone else you are incorrect. [15]     While I was a student at the University of Chicago, the law for me was easy to access, thanks to Law School's first class law library. The primary resource that I missed when I left the Law School (other than stimulating discourse) was access to the law made available by that library. In all of New York City, there is no comprehensive law library open to the general public without restriction. As a practicing lawyer there are a entire class of cases from middle class clients and small businesses that I have turned down for one simple reason: the client cannot afford reimbursing me for the necessary on-line legal research. Legal research costs are a particularly factor when the law (including unpublished federal district court opinions) of other jurisdictions is involved. [16]     In your letter, you state that paragraph numbering would "disfigure and bureaucratize the opinion-writing process." I am not at all sure what you (and Judge Williams who used the same term) mean and this appears to be an uncharacteristic exaggeration. I would assume that you would continue to write your opinions the way you have always done so, and that upon completion of your opinion writing, it would then be paragraph numbered. If you so desire, and with minimal training, you yourself could determine the location of paragraph numbers, as described in my comments to the Automation Committee. Interestingly, Judge Williams recently decided a case refusing access to caselaw stored upon on-line legal research systems maintained by the Department of Justice and the United States Air Force. Yet, both DOJ and the Air Force have filed comments in support of the ABA citation report. [17]     As far as disfigurement, the case reports in the West reporters have always contained paragraph numbers–although not every paragraph receives a number, and no one has ever before complained about disfigurement. Other jurisdictions including the Canadian courts, have been paragraph numbering opinions for years and, at least to my eye, their printed reports do not appear to be disfigured. In all due respect to Judge Williams, his comments about the civil law tradition and the FCC is a little emotional, is it not? Do you really contend that the common law system will in some way be undermined by courts numbering each paragraph of opinions? I enclose copies of recent West case reports for New Mexico and South Dakota which include the official paragraph numbers used by those courts. The disfigurement, if there is any, in part depends upon how the numbers are set in type. I hope you do not consider this letter to be disfigured becuase it's paragraphs are number, and I have selected a supercripted small font to avoid any claims of disfigurement. [18]     In your letter, you endorse the statement of Judge Williams where he states: The purpose of making possible pin [point] citations in which no private sector has a copyright can be as well achieved by allowing or requiring citation to pages of the slip opinions, identified by *s. (That may require insertion of some computer symbol in the computerized version of the slip opinion, but I don't see why that should be a difficulty.) [19]     Whether to number paragraph or pages received substantial attention from the various committees and individuals who have studied the best method of pin-point citation, and, after study, there was near unanimity to use paragraph numbers (at the academic level, the principal opponent of paragraph numbering is a frequent paid West expert witness in case citation proceedings.) There were a number of reasons for this conclusion. For example, some opinions appear in both manuscript and printed slip opinion and later bound volume format. When going from one to the other the pin-point pagination will change, which would mean that internal cross-references would change. In addition, when transferring a word processing version of an opinion from one system to another or from one program to another, the actual location of the page breaks will change. Even the use of a font in one system that is not available in another system will change the location of page breaks. [20]     In addition, there may even be a question as to what is page 1 of the opinion–whether a cover sheet or a table of contents is or is not part of the numbered pages. The only way to provide permanent precision for the location of page breaks and the page number is to insert a hard page break at the beginning of every page, and to also insert the page number at the beginning of every page. Of course, inserting hard page breaks in many word processing program may have many unintended consequences. And, the end result still is that page breaks appear in the most inconvenient locations, perhaps even in the middle of a citation. [21]     Remember as well that the proposed citation system must also work at the district court level where the opinions exist only in manuscript form, and must work for opinions that are never published in print. Thus, the district court judges, even were your suggestion to be accepted, would have to be sure to provide precision and permanence by inserting hard page breaks and page numbers–another "bureaucratic" task. [22]     Moreover, the Internet has already changed the way in which court opinions are disseminated. It is important to use a method that works well in the electronic environment, and paragraph numbers work better (it is little known that the pagination in Westlaw is different than the pagination of the same opinion in book form, because of the inconvenient places that page breaks tend to fall.) [23]     Indeed, it is instructive to inspect the Seventh Circuit opinions made available on your Court's bulletin board: those opinions contain no hard page breaks. Moreover, those opinions include neither the page numbers of the original manuscript nor the page number of the printed slip opinions. [24]     [The Seventh Circuit bulletin board opinions, unlike those in other Circuits:
Do not include italicization and underlining, not only in citations, but where the opinion author may have emphasized a word or phrase. Do not include indentations which makes it somewhat difficult to determine if a phrase was quoted. Are never corrected. Are not supplemented with amending orders. Do not include the names of counsel, factual information of considerable importance to researchers.]
[25]     Reading between the lines of your and Judge Williams' letter, one might conclude that you believe that the citation system is a theoretical concept that some Administrative Office bureaucrats and some techie ABA lawyers dreamed up, so as to create new burdens for an already burdened courts. Nothing could be further from the truth. [26]     For example, the ABA Committee was not a section committee but was a special committee appointed by the President of the ABA at the time (Roberta Cooper Ramo, a University of Chicago Law School alumna.) The members of that Committee were distinguished practicing attorneys, many of whom had experience as judicial clerks. Judge Danny Boggs of the Sixth Circuit (another University of Chicago Law School alumnus and a former faculty colleague of yours) was an ex- officio member who actively participated in the Committee's deliberations. [27]     I hope that you will reconsider your letter. If you wish, I would like to meet with you in Chicago to discuss these issues at greater depth. Cordially Alan D. Sugarman Class of 1971